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Introduction
The unusual weakness of the M2 monetary aggre-
gate over the past year or so has raised concerns
about implications for the economy and has
brought into question the reliability of this meas-
ure as a guide for policy. These concerns height-
ened last summer as initial reports indicated
that M2 declined in the third quarter, leaving it
around the lower bound of its target range. His-
torically, such sharp slowdowns in money growth
have been associated with subsequent weakness
in economic activity.'
By contrast, growth in the narrower Ml meas-
ure has been robust, having increased almost 9
percent in 1991 • Growth in the monetary base
has also been strong, driven to some extent by
the transitory foreign demand for U.S. currency
during the Gulf War. Moreover, Poole (199D
and Motley (1988) have proposed alternative
measures of money that suggest monetary
policy is not as stringent as it might appear.
From time to time, policymakers reexamine
the potential usefulness of alternative measures
of money as policy guides. Indeed, in the mid-
1980s, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) abandoned Ml as its primary policy tar-
get in favor of M2. One basis for forsaking Ml is
most clearly evident in the marked change in
the historical pattern of its velocity, defined as
the ratio of nominal income to Ml (see figure 1).
Over much of the postwar period, Ml velocity
increased steadily along a trend rate of 3 percent.
In the early 1980s, however, this measure became
substantially more variable with no clear trend.
The disruption in the historical pattern was attrib-
uted largely to financial innovation in conjunction
with deregulation and disinflation.
2
M2 velocity, on the other hand, appeared to be
unaffected by these events. Although the measure
has always varied systematically with interest
rates, it is essentially trendless both before and
after the early 1980s (see figure 1). In fact, since
the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913, M2
• 1 Although revisions to the data revealed that initial reports under-
stated M2 growth during the summer and for the year, the revised figures
were still inexplicably sluggish. We recognize, however, that the associa-
tion between money growth and economic activity does not imply causal-
ity. For a discussion of this issue, see Carlstrom and Gamber (1990).
• 2 For a discussion of the breakdown of M1 velocity and its implica-
tions for monetary targeting, see Poole (1988). For a brief summary of
the effects of financial innovation, deregulation, and disinflation on M1
and its velocity, see Judd and Scadding (1982) and Carlson (1989).FIGURE 1
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and nominal income have grown at approxi-
mately the same rate, suggesting the existence
of a relatively simple and enduring relationship
between the two.
On the surface, there is little basis for believ-
ing that M2 velocity has behaved unusually
over the past few years; after all, it is currently
close to its trendless long-run average. What is
unusual, however, is that around 1989, an appar-
ent break occurred in the relationship between
M2 velocity and the opportunity cost of the aggre-
gate, defined as the difference between the mar-
ket interest rate and the rates paid on M2 instru-
ments (see figure 2)? Since then, M2 velocity has
• 3 More precisely, the interest rate paid on M2 instruments isthe
weighted average of the component rates, where the weights are relative
shares. The market rate is (he weighted average of yields on the three-
month Treasury bill and the three-year Treasury note, with weights being
shares of both the non-time deposit (zero-maturity) and small time de-
posit components of M2. For further discussion of this opportunity cost
measure, see Carlson and Parrott (1991).
been trending up while its opportunity cost has
been falling. Yet, history suggests that velocity
should be declining, at least in the short run. Un-
derstanding this anomaly is, of course, important
for interpreting the aggregate's recent weakness.
This article examines the factors that some
analysts believe account for the unusual behav-
ior of M2 and its velocity. We also discuss alter-
native measures of money recently proposed by
Poole, and estimate a demand function for an
expanded measure of M2. The analysis suggests
that part of the anomalous behavior of M2 veloc-
ity is related to the ongoing restaicturing of the
savings and loan (thrift) industry. Although the
implications for the long ain are unclear, M2
velocity is likely to remain higher over the near
term than one might otherwise expect given the
level of its opportunity cost.
I. Velocity and the
Demand for Money
The concept of velocity is central to discussions of
monetary policy, largely because it affords the
Federal Reserve a straightforward and relatively
nontechnical language that Congress and the pub-
lic can easily understand.
4 The fact that M2 veloc-
ity has been trendless makes it easy to convey to the
public why the M2 aggregate might be viewed as a
reliable guide over the long term. As the simple
ratio of income to money, however, velocity em-
bodies some complex structural relationships.
Economic explanations for the behavior of
velocity have generally focused on the existence
of a "stable" money demand function. The notion
of stability typically implies that this function
should have relatively few arguments, and that it
should include some measure of spending or
economic activity (see Friedman [1956])? If the
function were to require knowledge about a large
number of variables in order to pin it down, the
simple relationship between money and eco-
nomic activity would be less predictable.
For many years, economists were confident
that reasonably stable money demand specifica-
tions could be estimated for narrow definitions
of money. Many specifications were based on
the inventory-theoretic models of Baumol (1952)
• 4 Since 1978, the FOMC has been required by law to report to
Congress on its annual monetary objectives. The Committee's progress
is reviewed at midyear and again at the beginning of the following year,
when the next set of objectives is reported.
• 5 For a recent comprehensive survey of the empirical I iterature
spawned by Friedman's restatement, see Judd and Scadding (1982).and Tobin (1956). One theoretical result of such
models was that the income elasticity of cash bal-
ances is less than one, implying that the velocity
of money would rise secularly.
This seemed to square with estimates of in-
come elasticity associated with conventional
specifications of Ml demand. Estimates of inter-
est elasticity, however, were much lower than
the theoretical models predicted.
6 Although
Hoffman and Rasche (1989) recently obtained
more substantial estimates of the long-run inter-
est elasticity of Ml, it is doubtful that stable
short-run specifications for Ml demand exist.
The evidence suggests that changes in the struc-
ture of the financial industry have affected Ml
demand in too many ways to pin down.
Because M2 velocity appeared to be imper-
vious to the financial changes of the 1970s and
early 1980s, attention turned toward finding
stable short-run specifications for M2 demand.
One of the most promising was developed by
Moore, Porter, and Small (1990), hereafter
referred to as MPS. They applied econometric
techniques that enabled them to take account of
the stationarity of M2 velocity and found that a
reasonably stable M2 demand specification
could be estimated, at least through 1988. Since
then, however, their model has overpredicted
M2 growth, raising questions about whether M2
velocity has drifted upward.
MPS specified M2 demand in an error-
correction framework, noting two advantages to
this approach.
8 First, error-correction regressors
— entered as first differences in the levels — are
more likely to be stationary and are much less co-
linear than they would be as undifferenced regres-
sors. Second, the long- and short-run money
demand relationships are clearly distinguished.
The long-run money demand function is
specified as
(1) mt = a + yt
where mt = log (M2), yt = log (nominal GNP),
and 5= log (opportunity cost). Note that the
unitary coefficient on nominal GNP ensures that
equation (1) also specifies a relationship in which
long-ain velocity varies only with opportunity
cost. Since one might expect M2 opportunity
cost to be essentially trendless in the long run, M2
velocity would also be trendless. Thus, although
equation (1) may specify a partial equilibrium for
the level of M2, the implied long-run general equi-
librium for its velocity is essentially a constant.
The second component of the MPS model is a






where et _ , is the deviation of money from its
long-am equilibrium value (derived from equa-
tion [1]) and e, is white noise. Adjustment speed
is determined by changes in the lagged values of
M2 and in the current and lagged values of the
opportunity cost and scale variable. The general
form of the model allows other variables to affect
adjustment speed (both current and lagged val-
ues). These variables, which need not affect long-
ain equilibrium money balances, include any
factors that influence the adjustment process.
1
0
Equation (2) essentially specifies the short-run
convergence process of M2 to its equilibrium val-
ue. When the coefficient on the error-correction
term is negative, convergence is ensured. Substi-
tuting (1) into (2) yields
(3) Aw,= a— ba.— b$st_ , + b(ml_ , — y,_ ,)
/= 16
;=i/=o
• 6 For a possible explanation of this discrepancy, see Poole (1988).
• 7 Although Hendry and Ericsson (1990) have found "stable" speci-
fications, these generally include many explanatory variables and hence
are not convincingly useful for predicting changes in the simple link be-
tween M1 and economic activity.
• 8 Earlier advocates of this framework include Baba, Hendry, and
Starr (1988).
• 9 MPS include a time index as a regressor to estimate any drift in
M2 velocity directly. Although they find the coefficient to be significant,
the drift is negligible (around 0.03 percent per year).
• 10 MPS also specify a set of error-correction models for determin-
ing interest rates paid on the components of M2. They find that many
bank deposit rates adjust relatively slowly to changes in money market in-
terest rates. However, because their specifications are not very durable,
we will focus only on the demand for M2 given the opportunity cost, not
on how the opportunity cost is determined.B 0 X 1
CP Specification
The CP specification and estimated coefficients are
Am,= -.053 - .009s,_ , - .138 (mt_ , -y,_,)
(4.44) (4.60) (5.13)







2 = .74; SEE = .0040; est. period = 1964JQ to 1986:IVQ,
where s is a measure of opportunity cost, c is personal con-
sumption expenditures, x is thrift deposits (including other
checkables, money market deposit accounts [MMDAs], savings
deposits, small and large time deposits, and term repurchase
agreements [RPs]), and REGDUM is a qualitative variable that
equals zero in all quarters except 1983:IQ, when it equals one.
a
Because thrift restructuring has been ongoing since 1988, and
because we seek to avoid high influence points given the sub-
stantial changes in the industry since that time, equation (4) is
estimated before the thrift crisis (1964:IQ to 1986:IVQ) and
simulated through 1990. All parameters are significant at the 5
percent level or better.
a. Following MPS, we present results that approximate log(s) using a first-
order Taylor series expansion when the opportunity cost is less than 0.5. We
also estimate the model using the simple log of opportunity cost. Although
the simple measure improves the in-sample fit. out-of-sample simulations are
less favorable. Nevertheless, the usefulness of the Taylog transformation
remains an open issue, though beyond the scope of this study.
MPS estimate a version of equation (3) over the
1964:IQ to 1986:IIQ period. They find that their
specification is relatively stable, despite the advent
of both deregulation and, perhaps more signifi-
cantly, disinflation. Beginning in 1988, however, it
begins to overpredict M2 growth.
The implications of this overprediction for
velocity depend on what parameters of the M2
demand function may be changing. If any of
those in the long-run specification (equation [1])
have changed, then M2 velocity will likely
fluctuate around a new, higher equilibrium
level. If, on the other hand, the error-correction
process is misspecified, the divergence between




Carlson and Parrott (199D, hereafter CP, pro-
pose a specification of equation (3) that includes
the change in thrift deposits as a determinant in
the error-correction equation (see box I).
1
1 They
argue that this change is a proxy for deposit-
pricing effects that, though related to the thrift
restructuring, are not adequately captured in the
measure of opportunity cost. This implicitly as-
sumes that the effects of restaicturing influence
the adjustment of M2 to its equilibrium level,
but do not affect the equilibrium level itself.
These effects may arise when failing thrifts
are liquidated and time deposit contracts are
abrogated. Because many of these deposits
were contracted at rates substantially higher
than those paid in recent years, holders of these
deposits realize a sharp drop in their returns
when contracts are nullified. Since the historical
series on time-deposit yields records only the
rate paid on new contracts, it understates this
recent decline. Thus, the measure of opportu-
nity cost is inadequate. For holders of abrogated
contracts, opportunity cost has increased; in
contrast, measured opportunity cost has fallen
in recent years.
The CP specification is estimated before 1988
to avoid high influence points given the collapse
in thrift deposits thereafter. (Out-of-sample sim-
ulations after 1988 account for most of the short-
fall evident in the MPS model.) The results are
consistent both with the hypothesis that thrift
restaicturing has played a major role in the recent
M2 weakness, and with the belief that this realign-
ment will not significantly alter long-am velocity.
It is important to note that the CP specification
does not examine the potential for effects on the
equilibrium level of velocity. Unfortunately, the
data are not of sufficient duration to discriminate
convincingly between long- and short-run effects.
Nevertheless, the depository restructuring hypoth-
esis is consistent with previous anomalies in the
relationship between interest rates and velocity.
For example, M2 velocity appeared to be un-
usually low in the mid-1980s, given the level of
its opportunity cost (see figure 2). Soon after the
advent of deregulation, many analysts specu-
lated that M2 velocity would shift downward.
1
2
It was believed that deregulation left the deposi-
tories in a better position to compete for funds to
11 For an alternative approach, see Duca (1991).
12 See Hallman, Porter, and Small (1989).FIGURE 3
MZM and M2E
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NOTE: M2H equals M2 plus institution-only MMMFs. MZM equals M2E minus small time deposits. Shaded areas represent recessions. Estimated
trough date for 1990-91 recession is 1991 :IIQ.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
expand their market share of credit; hence, many
argued that deposits included in M2 would in-
crease as a share of the nation's portfolio. This in
turn implied that M2 velocity would fall.
III. Alternative
Measures of Money
Historically, when money demand specifica-
tions have broken down, analysts have found
that the problem is often reflective of the partic-
ular definition of money being used. Over time,
financial innovations occur, resulting in new in-
struments that have properties similar to more
than one asset. For example, money market
mutual funds (MMMFs), first offered in the early
1970s, have characteristics of both transactions
deposits and mutual funds. Moreover, when
regulations change, such as the elimination of
Regulation Q, the range of assets for which
deposits are substitutable can be substantially
affected. Hence, financial innovation and dereg-
ulation can blur the functional distinctions be-
tween the monetary aggregates.
Poole (1991) recently identified three func-
tional components of M2: 1) traditional trans-
actions balances (currency plus checkable
deposits) that are defined as Ml, 2) savings bal-
ances that can be converted without notice into
transactions balances (such as MMMFs and state-
ment savings accounts at banks), and 3) small
time deposits (defined as certificates of deposit
denominated in amounts of less than $100,000)
that can be converted into transactions balances
(without penalty) only upon maturity.
Although M2 has served well until recently,
Poole questions its longer-term durability as the
appropriate measure of money. He proposes
two alternative aggregates. The first, based on a
principle advanced by Friedman and Schwartz
(1970), views money as a "temporary abode of
purchasing power." To satisfy this principle,
Poole advocates including all instruments avail-
able with zero maturity. Thus, he would broaden
Ml to include all savings balances that can be




Poole also advocates expanding the M2 meas-
ure (M2E hereafter) to include MMMFs available
to instiaitions only. He notes that these instru-
ments allow institutions to earn interest on check-
able accounts in the face of the long-standing and
still-effective prohibition of interest payments on
demand deposits. The time series of the two meas-
ures are illustrated in figure 3-
Prior to 1980, MZM velocity seemed to be
trending up, although at a slower rate than that
of Ml. Since 1983, however, MZM's velocity has
appeared to be the more stable of the two series
• 13 Although Motley (1988) proposed a measure of zero-maturity
instruments, the logical antecedent to this measure is Friedman and
Schwartz's M2 aggregate, which consists of all commercial bank deposits
(demand plus time and savings).FIGURE 4
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(see figure 4).
1' Poole recognizes that the stabil-
ity of MZM velocity (manifest only since dereg-
ulation) does not provide a sufficient empirical
basis for choosing this aggregate over the
broader alternatives. Nevertheless, he prefers it
because, as a comprehensive measure of assets
that serve as a temporary abode of purchasing
power, MZM should be durably linked to spend-
ing. Moreover, he essentially argues that the
trend in MZM velocity prior to 1980 was largely
a consequence of Regulation Q, which distorted
the competition between time deposits and non-
regulated depository assets.
Without Regulation Q, banks have much less
incentive for developing regulatory avoidance
schemes, such as automatic transfer accounts, that
distort the relationship between measured transac-
tions deposits and spending.
1"
1 Also, it seems rea-
• 14 Because there is no empirical basis for assuming that MZM
velocity has been stable, we do not estimate a demand function below.
sonable to assume that without interest-rate
regulation, banks will treat small time deposits
much more like managed liabilities, enabling them
to compete more directly in capital markets. Thus,
the volume of small CDs will be more indicative of
changes in the competitive positions of depositories
than of monetary conditions.
It also seems less likely that nondepository
competitors will have the same incentives to in-
vest in financial innovations that seek to compete
directly with depository savings instruments. For
example, the explosive growth of MMMFs was
due in large part to the inability of depositories
to compete for funds on the same footing with
liquid instalments offering market rates of
return. In the absence of binding constraints, it
is unlikely that we will see the same burst of
financial innovation as occurred under Regula-
tion Q; hence, one might expect a more stable
link between zero-maturity instruments and
economic activity. Since it remains to be seen
whether the principle guiding the choice of
MZM will lead to an empirically more robust
measure of money, however, Poole recom-
mends that M2 and MZM be given equal weight
in policy deliberations.
The velocity of M2E appears to have charac-
teristics that suggest its relationship to the econ-
omy is less disrupted by regulatory change than
that of M2 (see figure 5). Indeed, M2E velocity
has been falling in recent years roughly com-
mensurate with the decline in opportunity cost.
This more consistent pattern suggests that over
the whole sample period, the demand for M2E
has been relatively more stable than the
demand for M2.
Nevertheless, before it returned to a more
consistent relationship with interest rates, M2E
velocity was still unusually low over most of the
1980s. As suggested above, this could reflect the
unsustainable attempt by depositories to in-
crease their market share once they were freed
from the regulatory constraints that limited the
types of loans they could make. Perhaps the
best example of this was in the thrift industry.
By the early 1980s, the rising cost of funds,
reflecting accelerating inflation, had left many
thrifts that were holding relatively low-yielding
mortgages insolvent. Kane (1989, p. 4) argues
that, with nothing to lose, these "zombie" institu-
tions attempted "to grow out of their problems by
undertaking long-shot lending and funding
activities" that essentially renewed and ex-
• 15 Although the existence of reserve requirements on transactions
deposits leaves some incentive intact, the effects of most potential avoid-
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first step in resolving the insurance crisis, and to
close zombie thrifts. The weakness in deposit
growth since 1988 is to some extent an unwind-




We estimate two variations of the velocity speci-
fication (equation [3D using the M2E measure.
1
7
The first regression includes a temporary inter-
cept shift variable embodying the hypothesis
that the unsustainable expansion of depositories
affected equilibrium velocity in the 1980s. It pre-
sumes that the overextension of depository
intermediation was financed largely by time
deposits, which are closer substitutes for capital
market instruments than are money market se-
curities. This hypothesis would explain why a
large part of the runoff of nontransactions de-
posits at thrifts did not find its way back to other
depositories, but was instead transferred to non-
depository investment vehicles (see figure 6).
The first specification does not include the
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panded the lost bets of the past. To finance this
expansion, thrifts offered a premium on depos-
its, leading to a sharp increase in the depository
component of M2E (and M2) relative to income,
thereby decreasing velocity.
1
6 With the under-
standing that such instruments were federally
guaranteed, depositors were all too willing to
provide the funds. As the decade unfolded,
however, it became clear that this strategy was
not sustainable.
Beginning in 1989, Congress and the Bush
administration officially recognized the insolvency
of both a large portion of the savings and loan
industry and the thrift deposit insurance fund. In
August of that year, they allocated funds as the
• 16 As CP note, such a premium is not adequately incorporated in
measured yields. Thus, measured M2E opportunity cost probably over^-
states true opportunity cost. This would explain why M2 velocity appears
to be low relative to its measured opportunity cost.
(5.13) (5.25) (5.62)




+ .024REGDUM + £,
(5.61)
Adj. R
2 = .72; SEE = .0043; est. period = 1964:IQ
to 1989:IVQ,
where 5 is a measure of M2E opportunity cost, c
is personal consumption expenditures, DBUDUM
is the temporary intercept shift variable, and
REGDUM is a qualitative variable accounting
• 17 Although Hoffman and Rasche (1989) find a stable long-run
relationship between real M1, interest rates, and real income, they ques-
tion the existence of a stable short-run specification for M1 demand.
Hendry and Ericsson (1990) do find stable short-run specifications for
the narrow measure, but raise a number of issues that are beyond the
scope of this paper. We focus on the short-run demand for M2E, which
has the virtue of a trendless velocity over the past 30 years.FIGURE
Simulated and Actual M2E:
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for the introduction of nationwide NOW
accounts. DBUDUM and REGDUM equal zero
in all periods except 1981 :IVQ- 1988:IIQ and
1983:IQ, respectively, when they equal one.
The estimated coefficient on DBUDUM is
positive and statistically significant. This is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that equilibrium ve-
locity was temporarily low in the 1980s. Though
the model has reasonably good in-sample prop-
erties, out-of-sample simulations indicate that it
overpredicts M2E growth in 1991 (see figure 7).
The 1991:IIIQ drop in M2E (and the sharp rise
in its velocity) is greater than two standard




One explanation for the shortfall in M2 is
that the savings and loan restructuring peaked
in the summer months of 1991. Thus, the sec-
ond regression extends equation (4) to include
the change in thrift deposits as a regressor in the
error-correction specification:
(5) Am, = -.079 -.^
(5.64) (5.07) (6.10)
+ .21\Amt_ j - .OO8A5,- .006As/_1
(3.77) (4.05) (2.56)
+ .240Ac/ + .004DBUDUM t_,
(3.62) (3.18)
+ mi REGDUM + -180A xt_ , + £,
(6.37) (3.31)
Adj. R
2 = .75; SEE = .0041; est. period = 1964:IQ
to 1989:IVQ,
where x denotes thrift institution deposits (includ-
ing other checkables, MMDAs, savings deposits,
small and large time deposits, and term RPs). The
coefficient on the thrift proxy is statistically signifi-
cant, but somewhat smaller than in the CP specifi-
cation. This suggests that depository restructuring
is an important and continuing factor, at least in
the short run. Out-of-sample simulations of M2E
demand tend to underpredict M2E over most of
the past three years, but the bias has been small
(see figure 8). Thus, although not immune to the
strucairal change, the measure would seem to
warrant a closer look.
V. Conclusion
Changes in the structure of the U.S. financial in-
dustry have justifiably brought into question the
reliability of M2 as a guide for monetary policy.
The aggregate's appeal as an intennediate pol-
icy guide has been largely due to its relatively
stable and simple relationship with income and
interest rates. Over most of the past 30 years,
this stability was manifest in the behavior of M2
velocity, which, though influenced by interest
rates, ultimately reverted to a trendless mean.
Although M2 velocity, by itself, indicates noth-
ing unusual, its relationship with interest rates has
been disrupted in the last few years. This appears
to be related to a breakdown in M2 demand after
1988, which probably reflects to some extent the
restructuring of depositories.
We examine the velocities of two alternative
measures of money: MZM and M2E. Of these,
M2E holds the most promise, because its veloc-
ity appears to be least affected by the events of
recent years. Moreover, velocity specifications
of money demand seem to be more durable for
the M2E measure than for M2.
Nonetheless, we must stress the tentative nature
of any conclusions based on the analysis above.
Unfortunately, money demand theory has not ad-
vanced to a state in which empirical hypotheses
are sharply defined and testable. This perhaps re-
flects the tension arising from the idea that if
money demand is to be useful for policy, it should
have relatively few determinants.
On the other hand, as Judd and Scadding
(1982) note, the fundamental source of the insta-
bility of money demand has been the excessive
growth in money. They argue that the failure of
• 18 We recognize that statistical tests comparing M2 and M2E may
not be very meaningful. However, from a monetary targeting point of view, it
is much more persuasive if one can demonstrate an empirical basis for
believing that the velocity of the targeted aggregate is relatively stationary.monetary policy to restrain inflation led to the
high market interest rates that, in combination
with regulatory restraints, induced much of the
financial innovation disrupting the relationship
between Ml and the economy. Similarly, one
might argue that rising inflation was the funda-
mental source of the unsustainable expansion
— and ultimate collapse — of the thrift industry.
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